ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD June 17, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)	
)	
Complainant,)	
)	DCD 10 100
V.)	PCB 10-102
)	(Enforcement - Water)
CITY OF CHARLESTON, an Illinois)	
municipal corporation,)	
)	
Respondent.)	

ORDER OF THE BOARD (by G.T. Girard):

On June 9, 2010, the Office of the Attorney General, on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois (People), filed a three-count complaint against the City of Charleston (Charleston). The complaint concerns Charleston's wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) located at 750 West Madison Avenue in Charleston, Coles County. For the reasons below, the Board accepts the complaint for hearing.

Under the Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5 (2008)), the Attorney General and the State's Attorneys may bring actions before the Board to enforce Illinois' environmental requirements on behalf of the People. *See* 415 ILCS 5/31 (2008); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103. In this case, count I of the People's complaint alleges that Charleston violated Sections 12(a) and 12(d) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/12(a), (d) (2008)) and Sections 302.203, 304.106, 306.304, and 309.102(a) of the Board's water pollution regulations (35 Ill. Adm. Code 302.203, 304.106, 306.304, 309.102(a)) by (1) causing or allowing the discharge of contaminants and wastewater into the environment so as to cause water pollution resulting in a fish kill, (2) depositing contaminants upon the land in such a manner and place as to create a water pollution hazard, (3) discharging contaminants into waters of the State containing sludge or bottom deposits, floating debris, or color or turbidity of other than natural origin, (4) discharging untreated wastewater containing settleable solids, floating debris, or sludge solids, and (5) causing or allowing sewer overflows.

Count II of the complaint alleges that Charleston violated Sections 306.102(a) and 306.102(b) (35 III. Adm. Code 306.102(a), (b)) by (1) failing to construct and operate its WWTP so as to minimize violations of applicable standards during flooding, adverse weather, equipment failure, or maintenance and (2) failing to take all reasonable measures to prevent the spillage of contaminants from causing water pollution. In count III, the People allege that Charleston violated Section 12(f) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/12(f) (2008)) and Sections 304.141(a) and 309.102(a) of the Board's water pollution regulations (35 III. Adm. Code 304.141(a), 309.102(a)) by (1) discharging contaminants into waters of the State in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit and (2) discharging contaminants in its effluent in excess of the standards and limitations set forth in its NPDES permit. The People ask the

Board to order Charleston to cease and desist from any further violations and to pay civil penalties and the People's costs and reasonable attorney fees.

The Board finds that the complaint meets the content requirements of the Board's procedural rules and accepts the complaint for hearing. *See* 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(c), (f), 103.212(c). A respondent's failure to file an answer to a complaint within 60 days after receiving the complaint may have severe consequences. Generally, if Charleston fails within that timeframe to file an answer specifically denying, or asserting insufficient knowledge to form a belief of, a material allegation in the complaint, the Board will consider Charleston to have admitted the allegation. *See* 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(d).

The Board directs the hearing officer to proceed expeditiously to hearing. Among the hearing officer's responsibilities is the "duty... to ensure development of a clear, complete, and concise record for timely transmission to the Board." 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.610. A complete record in an enforcement case thoroughly addresses, among other things, the appropriate remedy, if any, for the alleged violations, including any civil penalty.

If a complainant proves an alleged violation, the Board considers the factors set forth in Sections 33(c) and 42(h) of the Act to fashion an appropriate remedy for the violation. See 415 ILCS 5/33(c), 42(h) (2008). Specifically, the Board considers the Section 33(c) factors in determining, first, what to order the respondent to do to correct an on-going violation, if any, and, second, whether to order the respondent to pay a civil penalty. The factors provided in Section 33(c) bear on the reasonableness of the circumstances surrounding the violation, such as the character and degree of any resulting interference with protecting public health, the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of compliance, and whether the respondent has subsequently eliminated the violation.

If, after considering the Section 33(c) factors, the Board decides to impose a civil penalty on the respondent, only then does the Board consider the Act's Section 42(h) factors in determining the appropriate amount of the civil penalty. Section 42(h) sets forth factors that may mitigate or aggravate the civil penalty amount, such as the duration and gravity of the violation, whether the respondent showed due diligence in attempting to comply, any economic benefit that the respondent accrued from delaying compliance, and the need to deter further violations by the respondent and others similarly situated.

With Public Act 93-575, effective January 1, 2004, the General Assembly changed the Act's civil penalty provisions, amending Section 42(h) and adding a new subsection (i) to Section 42. Section 42(h)(3) now states that any economic benefit to respondent from delayed compliance is to be determined by the "lowest cost alternative for achieving compliance." The amended Section 42(h) also requires the Board to ensure that the penalty is "at least as great as the economic benefits, if any, accrued by the respondent as a result of the violation, unless the Board finds that imposition of such penalty would result in an arbitrary of unreasonable financial hardship."

Under these amendments, the Board may also order a penalty lower than a respondent's economic benefit from delayed compliance if the respondent agrees to perform a "supplemental

environmental project" (SEP). A SEP is defined in Section 42(h)(7) as an "environmentally beneficial project" that a respondent "agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action . . . but which the respondent is not otherwise legally required to perform." SEPs are also added as a new Section 42(h) factor (Section 42(h)(7)), as is whether a respondent has "voluntary self-disclosed . . . the non-compliance to the [Illinois Environmental Protection] Agency" (Section 42(h)(6)). A new Section 42(i) lists nine criteria for establishing voluntary self-disclosure of non-compliance. A respondent establishing these criteria is entitled to a "reduction in the portion of the penalty that is not based on the economic benefit of non-compliance."

Accordingly, the Board further directs the hearing officer to advise the parties that in summary judgment motions and responses, at hearing, and in briefs, each party should consider: (1) proposing a remedy for a violation, if any (including whether to impose a civil penalty), and supporting its position with facts and arguments that address any or all of the Section 33(c) factors; and (2) proposing a civil penalty, if any (including a specific total dollar amount and the portion of that amount attributable to the respondent's economic benefit, if any, from delayed compliance), and supporting its position with facts and arguments that address any or all of the Section 42(h) factors. The Board also directs the hearing officer to advise the parties to address these issues in any stipulation and proposed settlement that may be filed with the Board.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

I, John Therriault, Assistant Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board adopted the above order on June 17, 2010, by a vote of 5-0.

John Therriault, Assistant Clerk Illinois Pollution Control Board